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Does evolutionary theory help, for a theory of the firm, or, more widely, a theory of 
organization? In this paper I argue that it does, to some but also limited extent. 
Evolutionary theories of economies, and of culture, have acquired considerable 
following, but have also been subject to considerable criticism. Most criticism has been 
aimed at inappropriate biological analogies, but recently it has been claimed that a 
‘universal Darwinism’, purged of all such mistaken analogy, is both useful and viable. 
Why should we try to preserve evolutionary theory, and will such theory stand up to 
sustained critical analysis? How useful is it for theory of the firm? Evolutionary theory 
appears to be the most adequate theory around for solving the problem of agency and 
structure, avoiding both an overly rational, managerial ‘strategic choice’ view of 
organizations and a ‘contingency’ view of organizations as fully determined by their 
environment. Whether universal Darwinism stands up to critical analysis remains to be 
seen. Here, the focus is on evolutionary theory of organization and of knowledge. Use is 
made of a constructivist ‘embodied cognition’ view of cognition and of elements of a 
cognitive theory of the firm.  
 
1 ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
In this paragraph I discuss key issues in evolutionary theory for behavioural science, in 
order to specify the questions to be answered. The first issue concerns the need to abstract 
evolution from evolution in biology, in a more general ‘universal’ Darwinism. The 
second issue concerns the notions of replicators and interactors, and their meaning and 
relevance for organizations and knowledge. The third issue concerns the influence that 
interactors may have on selection conditions. The fourth issue concerns replication by 
means of imitation and communication, and its relation with the generation of variety. 
The fourth issue concerns the extent to which, and in what sense, variety generation is 
‘blind’ and how it may be guided by experience in selection.  
 
Universal Darwinism 
 Beyond biology, a generalized evolutionary framework, with its basic principles of 
variety generation, selection and transmission, has been applied to a wide range of socio-
economic phenomena, such as organizations (Aldrich 1999, Baum and Singh 1994, 
McKelvey 1982), industries (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984, 1989), economies 
(Hodgson 1993, 2002b, Hodgson and Knudsen 2005, Metcalfe 1998, Nelson and Winter 
1982, Veblen 1919, Witt 1993, 2004), knowledge (Campbell 1974), neural structures 
(Edelman 1987) and culture (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Hull 1988).  
In behavioural science, the evolutionary perspective has a number of attractions. It 
accounts for development of forms (here forms of organization and of cognition) under 
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limited foresight. Wittgenstein (1976) spoke of language as a ‘form of life’, and perhaps 
evolutionary theory applies to all forms of life, in biology and culture. In economics and 
management evolutionary theory keeps us from the error of an unrealistically rational, 
magical view of development as the design by somehow prescient, or even clairvoyant, 
managers, entrepreneurs and scientists, as well as from the opposite error of institutional 
or technological determinism, whereby forms of organization are dictated by external 
conditions of technology and market (McKelvey 1982). In the first, managerial actors are 
omnipotent, and in the latter actors are absent. Evolutionary theory helps to deal with 
what in sociology is called the problem of agency and structure. It forces us to recognize 
both the role of actors, with their individual preferences and endowments, in the 
processes of variety generation and transmission, and the enabling and constraining 
conditions for action, in structures of markets and institutions, in the process of selection. 
While characteristics of entrepreneurs and organizations have a causal effect on survival 
and growth of firms, causality can also go to other way, with characteristics being the 
result of processes of selection and retention (Aldrich 1999, p. 336). It forces us to 
recognize causes of change both within organizations (‘autogenic’) and outside them 
(‘allogenic’)  (McKelvey 1982). It makes allowance for the radical uncertainty of 
innovation (Shackle 1961), and for evident and ubiquitous error and failure in human 
endeavor.  
Of great intellectual but also moral importance, evolutionary theory also forces us to 
accept diversity as an essential element of development and of societies. The old practice, 
in economic analysis, of dealing with an industry on the basis of a ‘representative firm’ is 
a fundamental mistake. As Hayek recognized, knowledge is dispersed and differentiated.  
Competition in markets and fields of knowledge, with constraining and enabling 
effects of institutions, are straightforwardly seen as yielding a process of differential 
survival and retention of products, practices and ideas. There is plausibility in seeing 
entrepreneurship and invention as sources of variety generation, and to see personnel 
turnover, training, personnel transfer, imitation, consultancy and growth as mechanisms 
for the transmission of proven success.  
Anyone who has studied socio-economic evolution recognizes that in many respects 
it differs radically from biological evolution. While earlier literature was often based on 
analogies from biological evolution, in more recent literature (Hodgson 2002b, Hodgson 
and Knudsen 2004, 2006) a radical abstraction has been made, in the definition of 
‘universal Darwinism’ (Dawkins 1983) in terms of only the overall, ‘meta-theoretical 
framework’ (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006: 16) of variety generation, selection and 
transmission, regardless of the very different ways in which they operate in different 
areas of application. Hodgson and Knudsen claim that this overall framework applies 
universally to biological as well as economic, cultural, and cognitive systems. It is needed 
to explain why some organizations last longer or grow more than others, and why some 
are imitated more than others (Hodgson and Knudsen 2005, p. 6). While universal 
Darwinism gives a useful conceptual orientation of research, it leaves most of the 
explanatory work still to be done, in a specification of the processes of variety generation, 
selection and transmission, in terms of people, cognition, work, management, invention, 
innovation, organizations, industries, markets and institutions.  
However, universal Darwinism goes further and specifies the principles of variety 
generation, selection and transmission in terms of the notions of replicators and 
 #0812 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 3
 
interactors (Campbell 1974, McKelvey 1982, Hull 1988) or vehicles (Dawkins 1983), 
and the notion of populations. Interactors/vehicles (in biology: organisms) interact with 
their selection environment, and are members of populations of similar but differentiated 
interactors (in biology: species). The suggestion is that these are essential elements of 
evolution, without which the notion of evolution becomes loose and indeterminate. They 
distinguish, it seems, Darwinism from a more general, looser, less determinate notion of 
evolution in the sense of ‘development’. However, as argued recently by Nelson (2006), 
this is also where the problems begin. The question then is how meaningful evolutionary 
theory is if the notions of interactors and replicators fail to apply.  
To function as an interactor, an entity must have a reasonably cohesive and stable set 
of components. This is the ecological side of evolution (Baum and Singh 1994). 
Interactors carry replicators (in biology: genes) that in the ontogenetic development of 
interactors generate characteristics of interactors that affect their survival and the 
replication of their replicators. This generation of characteristics (in biology: gene 
expression) takes place in interaction, within the interactor, between replicators and other 
features of the interactor, as well as with the environment of the interactor. Replicators 
may lie dormant until triggered by conditions. Note that it is not the replicators 
themselves that determine survival but the characteristics that they produce. Replicators 
may generate characteristics on different levels, including abilities to generate 
characteristics, depending on the circumstances.i  
Replicators from surviving interactors are replicated and re-combined, mostly within 
populations of interactors that partake of a common pool of replicators. This is the 
genealogical side of evolution, in the phylogenetics of a species.  
In economics, firms, in particular, are seen as interactors in their environments of 
markets and institutions in which they may go bankrupt, as members of industries that are 
seen as populations, and their competencies (McKelvey 1982) are seen as the 
corresponding replicators, with industries sharing a common pool of such competencies. 
In science, interactors presumably are most of all scientists, with survival here denoting 
career success, but what their replicators are is not so clear.   
The contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of the three least researched aspects 
of evolution in social science (Baum and Singh 1994): the identity of interactors, the 
nature and characteristics of replication, and the process of variety generation. The 
structure of the chapter is as follows. First I give a discussion of key issues in evolution in 
social science, in order to specify the questions addressed in this paper. Second I 
summarize a theory of cognition used here, and the cognitive view of organizations to 
which it leads, as discussed in Nooteboom (2006, 2009). This yields a view on the 
possible nature of their replicators, their identity as interactors, and on intra- and inter-
population differences between them. Third, I give an analysis of the sources of variation. 
The chapter ends with a summary of conclusions. 
In the literature on organizations, the present discussion falls squarely in what Aldrich 
(1999) called the ‘knowledge development’ stream of organization theory. Here, use of 
insights from cognitive science is inspired by the fact that in socio-economics both 
replication and variety generation are fundamentally cognitive and linguistic processes 
(Nooteboom 2001).  
 
Interactors and Replicators 
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The literature on evolutionary theory of organizations allows for connected evolutionary 
processes on multiple levels: of skills and jobs; of workgroups or communities of practice 
(Brown and Duguid 1996) within organizations (Burgelman 1983); of organizations 
within industries; and of industries in wider socio-economic systems (Baum and Singh 
1994). However, it is not always clear what, precisely, the interactors and replicators are, 
on different levels. Here I focus on organizations as interactors in industries, and on 
scholars as interactors in disciplines or scholarly ‘fora’ (de Groot 1969). The following 
questions arise. 
 The most fundamental question, perhaps, is to what extent in socio-economics the 
notions of interactors and replicators make sense at all (cf. Nelson 2006). Unlike biology, 
in the evolution of organizations and knowledge replicators in the form of organizational 
competencies and scientific ideas do not depend on the survival under selection of the 
interactors that carry them, as noted e.g. by Nelson (2006). It is not even completely clear 
what ‘failure’ or ‘being selected out’ entails, and I will return to this point later. Whatever 
it means, competencies and ideas from organizations and scholars may be adopted by 
other organizations and scholars long after the latter have ‘failed’. Often geniuses are not 
recognized, and their ideas are not adopted, until long after their death. Ideas can subside 
into obscurity, lurking in libraries, to be rediscovered or re-evaluated much later, without 
the need for intervening survival of its carrier. When organizations or scholars fail, 
whatever that means, some of their capabilities or ideas may still be seen as useful and 
adopted accordingly. Thus, purported replicators may float around, so to speak, 
disembodied from their carriers, possibly buried in unpublished documents, before they 
are replicated. If replicators may be disembodied from interactors, does the notion still 
make sense?    
In biology, replicators generate, in ontogenesis, the interactors that carry them. In 
organization and scholarship, actors are not only active in interacting with their 
environment but also in cognitive construction, which entails that they develop their 
replicators, on the basis of experience (Witt 2005). As is widely recognized, 
ontogenetically produced replicators may be adopted by others, so that here evolution is, 
at least in part, Lamarckian, with ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’. Thus, while 
interactors may be generated by replicators they also generate them. Furthermore, 
according to the perspective of ‘embodied cognition’, to be summarized later, interactors 
develop in interaction with a variety of other people, adopting and transforming some of 
their ideas and skills. Thus they are generated by the replicators not only of any well-
defined parent, but from a host of other interactors with greater or lesser ‘parenthood’. 
The notions of ‘parents’ and ‘offspring’ become diffuse. While in biology there is a clear 
separation between ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, in society there is not 
(Witt 2005).  
It is widely recognized that in social science interactors to some extent shape their 
replicators. For any remaining validity or usefulness of universal Darwinism, a key 
question is how far such shaping goes, and to what extent it reliably reflects selection 
conditions. Hodgson and Knudsen (2005) recognize that if direct shaping of replicators 
by their carriers were complete and fast, and would reliably reflect any shift or variety of 
the selection environment, evolution would break down. Survival would no longer be an 
indicator of success, and many unproven, worthless or deleterious traits would be 
imitated along with favorable ones. In other words, as recognized by most authors, for 
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evolution to work there must be some isolation of replicators from influence by 
interactors, or, in other words, some inertia of interactors (Hannan and Freeman 1984). 
My worry here is that the shaping of replicators may indeed to a considerable extent 
reflect often more or less erroneously perceived or inferred changes in the selection 
environment, in ways unproven by selection, and that indeed ‘many unproven, worthless 
or deleterious traits (are) imitated along with favorable ones’. Here, Darwinism perhaps 
does indeed break down. In financial markets excessive risk taking took a long time 
before producing the present financial crisis. 
For groups of people, such as organizations, to operate as interactors, in evolutionary 
terms there must be group selection. For that to work, individual interests must somehow 
be subjugated, to a sufficient extent, to collective interest. Organizational identity, 
cohesiveness and stability may be prevented by the dominance of centrifugal individual 
or group interests within the firm (Campbell 1994). So, what provides organizational 
cohesion and stability? Scholarly societies are also organizations, and a similar question 
arises there. In earlier and forthcoming work (Nooteboom 2000, 2006, 2009) I propose 
that organizations require an organizational ‘cognitive focus’ to limit ‘cognitive distance 
between people inside organizations, in order to achieve exploitation of resources. Here I 
propose that such focus yields an organizational identity that has some stability.  
Organizational focus enables but also constrains absorption of novelty that feeds 
organizational change. It serves as a filter for admitting and accepting outside ideas and 
people. In scholarly societies, established paradigms to some extent encapsulate the 
society from its environment. In other words, organizations are indeed subject to greater 
or lesser ‘inertia’ (Hannan and Freeman 1989). However, it still remains to be seen to 
what extent organizations may still escape from inertia. Indeed, the very notion of radical 
innovation seems to entail such an escape.  
If organizations and scholars are interactors, what are their replicators? As indicated 
earlier, the meaning of the notion of ‘replicators’ has several dimensions: things that are 
carried by an interactor (1), generate the interactor’s characteristics relevant for success  
in its interaction with its selection environment (2), and are transmitted to generate new 
interactors (3). McKelvey (1982) proposed that organizations are characterized by 
‘dominant competencies’. Nelson and Winter (1982) used the term ‘routines’, but there is 
some ambiguity and confusion around that term, and I prefer McKelvey’s terminology. 
What, precisely, are these organization-level competencies? I would say that elements of 
organizational cognitive focus might qualify, plus technologies and skills. If scholars are 
interactors, are their replicators ideas, hypotheses, or theories? These entities can indeed 
be seen as being carried by organizations and scholars, to generate their organizational 
and cognitive identities, and to be subject to transmission to others. However, as already 
noted, those entities may also be transmitted as disembodied from their carriers, to 
adopters whose identities are formed from multiple sources.    
To what extent can we meaningfully speak of ‘replication’ at all? Replication entails 
the maintenance, as a rule, of the content or properties of a replicator, with only 
occasional or limited ‘copying errors’, and without significant transformation of form, 
content or function. Is transmission of organizational competencies and of ideas 
sufficiently like that? In my view (cf. Nooteboom 2000) in communication significant 
transformation of meaning generally occurs, in the process of absorption or assimilation 
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into existing mental frames. Such assimilation is not a passive practice of copying but an 
active process of structuration and transformation.  
For industries to make sense as populations of organizations, there must be both 
differences and similarities between firms within an industry, and possibilities for 
replication that are greater within than between industries. Due to imitation and personnel 
mobility between organizations in an industry, or even between industries, organizational 
identities may not be sufficiently differentiated and isolated for selection to work (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985). How do we account for intra- and inter-industry differentiation? 
In science, do disciplines make sense as populations? Or are the populations here 
scientific societies within or across disciplines, or are those to be seen as niches within 
disciplines?  
In sum, the questions in this section are: what constitutes the replicators of 
organizations, in the form of organization-level competencies, how do these yield a 
cohesive and stable organizational identity, how does this yields differences as well as 
similarities within industries, more opportunities for replication within than between 
industries, and some but limited shaping of competencies as a function of experience in 
environments of markets and institutions. Partial answers have already been given. I will 
later analyze the questions in more detail.  
 
Selection 
In socio-economics, what is failure of interactors under selection? Is it the death of the 
interactor (organization, scholar), or some other manifestation of failure? In the context 
of firms selection arises from competition in markets, which may lead to their 
bankruptcy, take-over, break-up or management buy-out. As noted earlier, even in case of 
complete failure, in bankruptcy, some of its capabilities may be adopted as useful by 
others. In science, selection takes the form of refutation, ideally on the basis of empirical 
falsification (Popper 1959), or other critical debate in scientific ‘fora’, rejection of papers 
by journals and rejection of proposals for funding research. This may kill, but only one 
idea or publication, which may subsequently be revised or improved to survive later in a 
different form.    
Also, as noted by Witt (2005) and Nelson (2006), particularly in economics and 
science there is much ‘pre-practice’ testing, in mental thought experiments, debate, 
computer simulations, the testing of physical prototypes, market testing and consumer 
focus groups. Human beings learn testing and experimentation before practice at an early 
age, in child’s play, and proceed to refine their mental experimentation in later education. 
Such outside-practice testing would have to be included in the notion of selection. 
However, that means that some selection is not in the selection ‘environment’ but internal 
to an individual actor or organization.  
A key issue in evolutionary theory of organizations and scholars is that singly or 
collectively they can to a greater or lesser extent affect or even mold the external 
selection environment of markets and institutions to favour their survival and 
reproduction, in ‘co-evolution’ or ‘niche-construction’ (Aldrich 1999). Selection is 
political, and is shaped or avoided by debate, rhetoric, indoctrination, coalition formation 
and positions of power and influence (or the lack of it). Are these to be seen as part of 
selection or as avoidance of it? While influence of interactors on the selection 
environment, in co-evolution, is not unique for socio-economics, and also occurs to a 
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considerable extent in biology, in economic systems the scope for it seems to be of a 
different order of magnitude, on the basis of some intelligent inference of selection forces 
and the ability, power and political influence of some organizations to shape such forces, 
in setting standards of technology, conditions of legitimacy, shaping market structure 
(e.g. distribution channels), and erecting entry barriers.  
 An example of the setting of selection conditions from Garud and Rappa (1996) 
concerns the rivalry between competing technologies for hearing aids in the form of 
implants in the cochlea, in the inner ear. There were two rival systems: a single channel 
and a multiple channel device. The first carried less risk than the second did, but the 
second yielded a greater and easier improvement of hearing. The problem was that 
objective, independent measures of these dimensions of performance were not available, 
and the balancing between them is subjective. The same ideas that informed the choice of 
device also informed the methodologies for selecting between them, so that there were 
rival evaluation methods. The rival methods were championed by rival commercial 
interest groups, and the stakes were high. The single channel group argued that the 
obvious choice was to begin with the low risk device, and step up to the other after its 
risks were clearer and could be reduced. The multiple channel group argued that this 
would not reduce risk but add to it in the process of taking out one device and replacing it 
with the other. No objective experience was available to back up either claim.     
Let me give another illustration. In the innovation of a cotton carpet (instead of wool), 
it was first introduced for bedrooms, in view of the moisture regulating properties of 
cotton and its nice feel to bare feet. However, cotton fiber does not have the natural 
resilience of wool, so that in use the pile of a cotton carpet rapidly flattens, but after 
vacuuming regains its fresh look. Now, resistance of carpets to such pile flattening was a 
key feature in the existing certification of quality, thus favoring wool over cotton, and the 
new carpet could effectively enter the market only after the innovator, sufficiently large 
and influential, managed to wield his influence to have the certification procedure 
modified to accept vacuuming prior to inspection. Such actions to mold the selection 
environment are also amply illustrated by Aldrich (1999: 334).  
In science, when scholars face a lack of survival and replication of their ideas, in 
failed access to journals, or in their papers remaining ignored or uncited, they can, and 
often do, create their own selection environment by founding their own scholarly 
societies with their more or less proprietary journals. Their ideas survive not only, and 
perhaps not even primarily, from their scientific as much as from their organizational and 
rhetorical skills.   
One may argue that even though for these reasons selection may be limited or 
inefficient, not even the most visionary entrepreneur, nor the most powerful of 
corporations, nor the most able organizer or rhetorician can completely mold his 
environment to guarantee success, survival and dominance, and some selective pressure 
will remain. The limits are not only limits of power, but also cognitive limits. One is not 
infallible in inferring what structure of selection favours differential survival and growth, 
for lack of insight in causalities of selection and in opportunities that any change might 
yield to unforeseeable new innovations that may constitute a threat to incumbent 
organizations. Returning to the example of the cotton carpet, the most salient thing is 
perhaps that it took effort to alter the selection conditions, even in only one though 
crucial respect, which might have failed, in which case the innovation would likely not 
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have survived. While there is much more to be said about this issue, it is not a subject for 
the present paper, since although selection seems very imperfect it still seems sufficient 
to let this issue pass. In sum, for the sake of argument here I will accept that selection by 
competition still makes sufficient sense, in markets and scientific rivalry.  
 
Replication 
A third issue concerns processes of replication, and the relation between replication and 
variety generation. In socio-economic evolution, replication entails reproduction and 
imitation of knowledge and competencies, on different levels. This occurs on the basis of 
observation, communication and apprenticeship. Successful products and practices are 
copied or imitated on the basis of observation and inference, reverse engineering, 
publications and documents, oral presentations, courses, reports and explanations by 
consultants, and the like. Apprenticeship may merit special notice. Knowledge is 
externalized not only in speech, documents, software and ostensive activity, or role 
models, but is also embodied in tools, in a general sense including machines, procedures 
and forms of organization. In learning to use tools, an apprentice may reconstruct some of 
the mental schema’s that lay behind the design and production of the tool.  
In socio-economics, these forms of replication entail linguistic processes of 
expression, sense and reference, and cognitive processes of assimilation into mental 
schemata (Aldrich 1999, Piaget 1970, 1974) or mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983) that 
constitute absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Fundamentally different from 
replication of genes in biology, replication of knowledge and competencies is: 
- At least partly voluntary and subject to choice: one adopts what is perceived to be 
successful 
- Partial: one may, within restrictions of systemic coherence, adopt only part of a 
bundle of replicators carried by a given interactor 
- Subject to decay, distortion, reduction, extension and transformation (going far 
beyond the copying errors, deletions and duplications of genes in biology). In 
other words, replication at the same time entails a kind and a degree of variety 
generation. 
This issue will be analyzed with the use of insights from the perspective of ‘embodied 
cognition’.  
 
Variation 
A fourth issue, in evolutionary theory, and this is the third subject for the present paper, 
concerns the sources of variation, in particular the question how blind and how 
independent from selection variety generation is.  
According to most evolutionary accounts, the main trigger of radical innovation is a 
shock in the form of a break or shift of the selection environment, which may increase 
competition for scarce resources, disadvantage incumbent species, and create new 
opportunities for new variety. Such a shift or shock may be due to natural disaster, 
political upheaval and war, a shift in demand, a shift in institutions (e.g. regulations for 
protecting the environment), or a shift due to developments in related industries or 
markets. However, this tells us only of new opportunities, of how radical innovation is 
enabled or triggered, not of how it is generated. 
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In evolutionary theory, generation of new variety, in new interpretations or new ideas, 
is generally ascribed to errors in replication, and random, uninformed trials as steps into 
the dark (‘mutations’). In the methodology of complex adaptive systems (Holland 1996), 
the conduct of agents is modeled in terms of if-then rules, which are sometimes modeled, 
in analogy to chromosomes, as bit-strings of messages sent in response to bit-strings of 
messages received, and the discovery of rules is modeled as random mutations of values 
at positions in the string plus random crossover of strings, in analogy to sexual 
reproduction. How valid or adequate is this, as a model of human learning and 
communication?  
In socio-economic evolution there is no doubt much trial and error in entrepreneurial 
venturing, and more so to the extent that the innovation is radical, i.e. entails destruction 
of existing competencies (Anderson and Tushman 1990, Tushman and Anderson 1986), 
technologies, and forms of organization, limiting the opportunity to build on existing 
knowledge and competence. However, evidently in socio-economic evolution there is 
invention and knowledge development that is informed, somehow, by experience from 
failures and resulting inferences about where sources of failure may lie and where to look 
for improvements. This is too obvious to ignore or deny, and Aldrich  (1999), Foster and 
Metcalfe (2001) and Nelson and Winter (1982), to name only a few, all recognized that 
next to blindness there is also intentional, deliberate, and somehow directed variety 
generation.  
Thus, according to Foster and Metcalfe (2001: 10) 
 
‘The rate of economic progress that we observe reflects guided variation within 
conceptual schemes that channel explorative, creative enquiry in particular 
directions’. However, they immediately add: ‘Of course, all variation is, in effect, 
blind variation, since it necessarily deals with the unknowable consequences of a 
present decision.’  
 
What does it mean that variation is both guided and blind? Little, if anything, in the 
evolutionary literature, is said how the ‘guidance’ or ‘direction’ of variation works in 
‘explorative, creative enquiry’. More generally, the generation of variety is the least 
developed side of evolution in socio-economic systems (Baum and Singh 1994, p. 18).  
According to Hodgson and Knudsen (2005, p. 11) evolution is blind in two senses. 
First,  
 
… particular outcomes are not necessarily prefigured or predicted in advance. 
 
I agree with that. However, this leaves open the possibility of an intelligent design of 
a heuristic path of discovery, guided by experience from selection, that is likely to yield 
radical novelty, even though it cannot be predicted what that will be. That is precisely 
what I will argue.  
According to Campbell (1987),  
 
.. any capacity for foresight or prescience must be based on tried and tested 
knowledge, otherwise we have no grounds to presume its effectiveness. Accordingly, 
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when genuine innovations are launched, we are unable to assess the probability of 
their success or failure (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006, p. 11).  
 
I agree with the first part (experience is needed to presume effectiveness) but I 
disagree with the second part. Because we can make inferences from experience we can 
‘presume effectiveness’, i.e. increase likelihood of success beyond blind trials, even if 
perhaps that cannot be rendered in terms of probability theory (cf. Shackle 1962).  
Campbell (1974) specified blindness as entailing variations that are (1) independent 
of each other, (2) separate from the environment, (3) uncorrelated with the solution, and 
(4) later variations are not corrections of former ones. Applying these criteria, I will argue 
that there is non-blind variation.  
The often-heard claim that a theory of invention would be self-defeating or even self-
contradictory, because by definition invention cannot be predicted, is based on confusion 
between prediction and explanation. One can claim to have some understanding of 
processes of invention without thereby claiming to be able to predict its outcomes. That 
applies to evolutionary theory more broadly: it explains principles of process without 
claiming to predict its outcomes.  
In the evolutionary literature, some authors have allowed for variations that are 
guided from higher level, variety generating ‘search’ routines (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Other literature also suggests that there are higher level ‘dynamic capabilities’ that direct 
the change of lower level capabilities (Teece et al. 1997). Dynamic capabilities include 
rational inference of cause-effect relations, rules for experimentation, and ability to 
utilize organizational memory. They also include exchange of codified knowledge with 
others, in what (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) called ‘knowledge combination’ and Zollo 
and Winter (2002) later called ‘deliberate’ as opposed to ‘experiential’ learning. So, the 
question now is to what extent, and how, organizations can develop dynamic capabilities 
to escape from inertia. In what sense, and to what extent is this blind? How is it related to 
selection, and to what extent can it anticipate success in selection?  
   
2. ORGANIZATIONS, INDUSTRIES AND SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES 
 
In this paragraph I analyze the identity of organizations as interactors in terms of the 
notion of organizational cognitive focus and its cultural expression, differences between 
organizations within and between industries, seen as populations, and the ‘isolating 
mechanisms’ between populations. I start with a summary of the ‘embodied cognition’ 
view used here, and its application to theory of the firm, taken from (Nooteboom 2000, 
2009). 
 
Cognitive theory 
 
Briefly, the embodied cognition view claims that people perceive, interpret and evaluate 
the world according to mental categories (or frames or mental models) that they have 
developed in interaction with their social and physical environment. Since the 
construction of cognition takes place on the basis of interaction with the physical and 
social environment, which varies between people, ‘different minds think different things’, 
as was recognized by Austrian economists (Lachmann 1978), and there is ‘cognitive 
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distance’ between people to the extent that they have developed their cognition in different 
environments (Nooteboom 1992, 1999). This connects with Hayek’s view of localized, 
distributed knowledge. As a result of context-dependent cognitive structuring, cognition 
is bounded not only in the sense that one has a limited capacity for rational evaluation, 
but in the more fundamental sense that one’s perspective is biased by experience.  
Cognitive distance between people, resulting from variety of experience, presents 
both a problem and an opportunity. The opportunity is that variety of cognition is a 
source of innovation. The problem is that to the extent that cognition differs, it is more 
difficult to understand each other and to collaborate and utilize opportunities from 
cognitive variety. Note that, cognition being a wide concept in this paper, cognitive 
distance entails both difference in intellectual knowledge and difference in feeling and 
morality. Cognitive distance yields not only a difficulty of mutual understanding, or limit 
to absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), but a wider difficulty of 
collaboration, including a mismatch of moral and motivational aspects of collaboration. 
In other words: distance includes issues of both competence and governance. 
 Optimal collaboration requires a trade-off between the upside and the downside of 
cognitive distance, seeking ‘optimal cognitive distance’, large enough to offer variety for 
innovation, and small enough to enable collaboration. Here, I propose, lies the 
fundamental purpose of firms, and organizations more in general. That purpose, I 
propose, is achieved by means of an organizational cognitive focus, which has both 
intellectual and moral/emotional features. To function as a coordinated system of actions, 
organizations need some more or less specialized shared language or jargon, perceptions, 
understanding and morality, as part of organizational culture (Schein 1985). Without such 
focus of shared perceptions, meanings, understandings and values, too much effort, time 
and aggravation would have to be spent to disambiguate meanings, eliminate 
misunderstanding, set priorities, establish directions, coordinate activities, align 
incentives and negotiate the terms of collaboration. This is the view of organization as a 
system for ‘sense-making’ (Weick 1995), ‘collective mind’ (Weick and Roberts 1993), 
system of ‘shared meanings’ (Smircich 1983). Witt (2005) offered a related view of 
entrepreneurs as providing ‘cognitive leadership’. 
To achieve focus, organizations develop their own specialized semiotic systems, in 
language, symbols, metaphors, myths, and rituals. This is what we call organizational 
culture. This differs between organizations to the extent that they have different goals and 
have accumulated different experiences, in different industries, technologies and markets. 
The central difference between firm and market is that in the former such focus is made 
and in the latter it is not, or to a much lesser extent (there still is a remaining, shared 
cognitive focus from shared national or regional culture). Thus the market has the higher 
potentiality of variety of performance, and the firm has the higher actuality of 
performance. 
 On the competence side, focus is needed to enable people to understand each other 
and connect complementary knowledge, without unduly restricting variety and creativity. 
On the governance side, focus is needed to motivate people to collaborate and share and 
connect knowledge, without unduly restricting autonomy, ambition and competitive 
spirit.  
Organizational focus also has a function of both selection and adaptation of people. In 
selection, it selects people, in recruitment but often on the basis of self-selection of 
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personnel joining the organization because they feel affinity with it, and adaptation, in 
socialization into the firm, and training, of incoming personnel. To perform these 
functions, focus must be embodied in some visible form. Such form is needed for several 
reasons. One is to function as a signaling device to outsiders. That is needed as a basis of 
the (self)selection process of incoming staff, and for recognition and identification by 
other stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers. Another, deeper reason is to stabilize 
the mental processes associated with organizational focus. As such, materialization of 
organizational focus has the same function as the body has for individual cognitive 
identity. Cognitive activities in an organization require some embodiment to crystallize, 
direct and stabilize cognition and communication within the organization. Here we find 
symbols, such as logo’s, and style of advertisement and external communication. More 
for the internal function of coordination, we find the exemplary behaviour of 
organizational heroes, often a founder of the organization, corresponding myths, and 
rituals. More formalized forms of organization are procedures, for reporting, decision-
making, recruitment, contracting, and the like. Finally, if it is indeed true that cognition is 
constructed on the basis of interaction in a given environment, the shared environment of 
the firm will generate a certain similarity in further cognitive development op people 
within the firm.  
 
Organizational Identity 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) usefully argued that the cohesiveness of the interactor, 
needed for evolution to work, requires at least a core of components that stand or fall 
together with each other and with the interactor as a whole. More precisely, the 
probability of survival of one component is connected with the survival of other 
components in that core. The question now is how organizations achieve the cohesion 
and stability required for interactors.  
The answer proposed here lies in the notion of an organization as a cognitive focusing 
device. The main point here, for the present paper, is that organizational cognitive focus, 
produced and reproduced by organizational culture, and by people socialized into that 
culture, forms the core of organization-level competence, to achieve coordinated bundles 
of competencies or capabilities. Organizational focus constitutes a cohesive (but not 
necessarily consistent) whole of perceptions, meanings and values that define roles, 
relations and procedures of interaction, and thereby yield the requisite cohesion and 
stability of organizations as interactors. Now, is it this focus or the set of capabilities that 
are coordinated by it that constitutes the set of replicators of an organization? Clearly it is 
the focus, since that is unique and specific to the organization, while the capabilities that 
it coordinates are on the individual rather than the organizational level, and are more 
universal, ranging across organizations, in professions. 
How does this compare with McKelvey’s view of replicators as ‘dominant 
competencies’? There is no conflict if we see the latter as organizational rather than 
individual, and the cultural and cognitive elements of focus may be seen as a further 
specification of those organizational dominant competencies. Here, ‘dominant’ means 
that they are shared by at least a ‘dominant coalition’, and that they condition, i.e. 
structure, enable and constrain, actions, and have normative content or import. In other 
words: they are institutions. Thus I prefer to see the replicators as institutions rather than 
competencies, though they do constitute organizational competence. Nelson and Winter 
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(1982) speak of ‘routines’. But, again, in view of their regulatory, constitutive and 
normative nature I prefer to see them as institutions. However, they are a specific kind of 
(organizational) institutions, and I prefer to simply call them elements of organizational 
focus.  
While the raison d’être of organization as a focusing device is that it enables 
cognitive and moral coordination, for the sake of efficient goal achievement, and is 
therefore selected for in market competition, it also helps to create the stable and 
differentiated organizational identities needed for evolutionary selection of organizations 
to work.  
Organizational focus emerges from the imprint from the entrepreneur who started the 
organization, is subject to some drift due to turnover of staff, and to shifts due to crises, 
caused, in particular, by shifts in the environment, or by new, challenging interpretations 
of the environment, and by the weeding out by selection, in population effects. When 
resources are scarce and competition is tight, selection is likely, in the long run, to yield 
organizational cognitions and structures that reflect the exigencies of the environment of 
markets and institutions. Consider, for example, the view that stable environments tend to 
favour ‘mechanistic’ environments while turbulent environments tend to favour ‘organic’ 
ones (Burns and Stalker 1961), or more specialist vs. more generalist organizations 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977). However, focus is stable because it is reproduced in action 
by people who are selected, partially self-selected, in recruitment, according to their 
affinity to the focus, are socialized into the organization, and further construct their 
cognition from the input from interaction in the organizational institutional environment. 
Recall, here again, that according to the idea of intelligence as internalized action, the 
further development of cognition reflects the environment, in this case the organization, 
in which cognitive construction takes place. 
Organizational focus cannot be integrally and instantly re-shaped as a function of 
experience in selection, and this limits Lamarckian adaptation, and yields some 
organizational inertia. The limits to such change lie in the systemic cohesion of elements 
of cognitive focus and in the fact that cognitive focus serves as an absorptive capacity 
that tends to mostly confirm itself in its functioning (imprinting). However, and this will 
be discussed later, in the discussion of a ‘cycle of discovery’, there is a process by which 
absorptive capacity does transform itself in its functioning, so that there is some 
Lamarckian mechanism, and an escape from inertia, but in a series of conditioned steps 
that require time. It is an empirical question to what extent the speed of that is sufficient 
to escape from selective pressures.  
 
Organizational Boundaries 
The cognitive perspective of organization gives a new slant on organizational boundaries 
and on inter-firm alliances. Aldrich’s (1999) definition of organization as goal-directed, 
coordinated activity systems (which I adopt) also includes the maintenance of more or 
less clear, stable boundaries (which I reject). Of course, boundaries of legal identity 
remain fairly clear, as they should (Hodgson 2002a), but organizationally there may be 
durable relationships between organizations, supported by some cognitive focus of shared 
perceptions, language and norms, even though that focus is less cohesive, and probably 
also less inclusive, than within organizations. In that sense, counter to Hodgson (2002a, 
2006), it is quite legitimate to speak of ‘fuzzy boundaries’, in terms of elements of 
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organizational focus that are shared between organizations, and of common institutions, 
even while clarity of legal boundaries and legal identity is preserved.  
While clear and stable boundaries may apply to most traditional organizations, it is 
much less the case for modern web-based, ‘virtual’ enterprises and network forms of 
organization. Apparently, the assumption of clear and stable boundaries is deemed 
necessary to yield the organizational cohesion needed to make evolutionary selection 
work. But why would entrepreneurs or managers want that selection to work? If with 
fuzzy and/or variable boundaries, imitation, and buy-out of personnel from other firms 
they can escape selective forces, why shouldn’t they? The following conundrum then 
arises. If organizations are selected, in evolution, for their ability not to have clear and 
stable boundaries, while those are necessary for selection to work, how can this be?  
My view is that the notion of cognitive focus is sufficient for a stable and cohesive 
identity of organizations while it does not require clear and stable boundaries of activity, 
and allows for parts of focus being shared with other organizations, as long as 
organizational focus is still distinctive. It may be that organizations make their focus so 
lacking in cohesiveness, with a small width, little or no reach, and little or no tightness, 
that boundaries are hard to establish, apart from the legal ones, and the firm becomes like 
a market. But then the organization would have hardly any identity left, and one could 
hardly speak of an organization any longer.  
Organizational focus creates organizational myopia, more so to the extent that it is 
cohesive and inclusive, and in addition to all the other motives for inter-firm alliances, 
familiar from the extensive alliance literature, this gives an additional, cognitive reason, 
to prevent myopia by means of complementary outside cognition from alliance partners 
(in ‘external economy of cognitive scope’, Nooteboom 1992, 1999). Here, the notion of 
cognitive distance applies to organizations, as differences in shared language, meanings, 
perceptions, understandings and values and norms of behaviour. In empirical work 
measures of the cognitive distance between firms, or proxies for them, have been 
constructed on the basis of indicators from organizational data and technological profiles 
derived from patent data (Wuyts et al. 2005, Nooteboom et al. 2007).  
Note here the condition, familiar from the alliance literature, that when organizations 
outsource activities they must often still retain absorptive capacity with respect to those 
activities to properly collaborate and coordinate with outside sources (Granstrand, Patel 
and Pavitt 1997). As indicated before, organizations may not have clear boundaries of 
activities, in sharing activities with other organizations, and may have shifting 
boundaries, in outsourcing and integrating activities, and may share elements of 
organizational focus with other organizations.  
 
Intra-Population Differentiation 
Within industries, cognitive distance, i.e. difference in organizational focus, is limited, 
particularly concerning the competence side of technologies and competencies, in shared 
technologies, market demand, market structures, technical and professional standards, 
etc., yielding what may be seen as a common pool of competencies (McKelvey 1982). As 
a result, staff exchange between organizations is feasible and can create and confirm the 
identity of an industry (McKelvey 1982: 197), yielding ‘industry recipes’ (Spender 
1989). This is also enhanced by pressures towards conformity to dominant designs and 
practices from needs of efficiency and of social, political or financial legitimation 
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(‘mimetic forces’, Dimaggio and Powell 1983). However, while firms may share 
component skills and technologies, particularly within an industry, their overall 
composition of capabilities and activities, in a coherent system, may differ substantially. 
But above all, organizations have their distinctive identities of cognitive focus.  
As noted before, to the extent that an organizational system is systemic or complex, 
as defined earlier, piecemeal, local variation of single elements is problematic since it 
soon affects the integrity of the system as a whole. Then, when there is one difference 
between firms there tend to be many, in distinctive systemic wholes (Levinthal 2000).ii In 
sum, when operational structure is complex, even with similar components integrated 
systems may differ greatly.  
For an illustration of this, consider the comparison, in the automobile industry, 
between the older ‘Fordist’ production system, and the newer ‘Toyota’ system (Coriat 
2002). The differences are systemic. The Toyota system has a tight connection of mutual 
conditioning between the goal of small series of differentiated products, the 
organizational principles required by the ‘demand pull’ principle, such as integrated team 
responsibility for quality and scheduling, lack of hierarchical planning, zero stocks, and 
just in time production, human resource principles of multi-skilled workers, job rotation, 
and career prospects, and the physical configuration of machinery according to the 
sequence of value adding activities. One cannot change any of these components without 
changing others, and ending up in an entirely different system. 
Also, even within industries organizational focus is more varied, and organizational 
cognitive distance is correspondingly greater, on the governance side of the moral, 
intentional, institutional order, in different styles or cultures of management. Deep 
differences in fundamental perceptions, views and (largely tacit) assumptions concerning 
man, his knowledge (e.g. objective or constructed), his relation with his environment 
(passive or active), his morality (basically good or bad), and relations with other people 
(egotistic or altruistic) (Schein 1985), yield differences in risk perception and acceptance, 
pro-activeness (‘locus of control’), formality or informality, rivalry or cooperation, 
intrinsic or extrinsic motivation, instruments and styles of governance and conflict 
resolution. From an evolutionary perspective, the persistence of such differences, in spite 
of selection pressures, suggests that on the moral, intentional side there are different ways 
to be successful, at least temporarily, within an industry.   
In industrial dynamics, a central issue is how to combine exploitation and exploration 
(March 1991). While earlier some industries were relatively stable, allowing for a focus 
on exploitation, and others were in a state of flux, yielding a focus on exploration, now 
the combination of the two is needed in most if not all industries, although the priority of 
exploitation or exploration varies, depending on the volatility of technologies and 
markets involved. Combination of the two is particularly difficult when exploitation is 
highly systemic, as defined earlier. Then, by definition, units within the system hardly 
have any room for the experimentation and deviation needed for exploration, since they 
would jeopardize systemic integrity. In that situation, exploration needs to be relegated to 
a different time or place. The classic case is the division between departments for 
production and for R&D. This yields the classic problem of divergent mentalities and 
priorities between them, with resulting misunderstandings, conflicts and recriminations. It 
is difficult, though not hopeless, to find an organizational focus that accommodates both. 
One method is to engage in cross-functional teams, and another is frequent staff rotation, 
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with an organizational focus to support that, mostly on the governance side, in values and 
norms of conduct that favour acceptance of differences in competence, work conditions, 
styles of thought and action, time framing, and tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Another would be to create more flexibility by decomposing the exploitation system into 
more autonomous parts, accepting loss of exploitative efficiency for the sake of 
exploration. Such choices may be made differently by different firms, even within an 
industry, with corresponding differences in organizational cognitive focus.  
As noted before, cultural differentiation between organizations is maintained, in spite 
of turnover and exchange of staff, because in the entry into an organization there is 
(self)selection according to expected fit to organizational culture, adaptation by 
socialization into organizational culture, and organization-specific cognitive construction.  
Finally, there are differences in the content of focus. Some firms may emphasize 
surface level elements of focus, in more ad hoc specific rules and procedures, leaving 
wider variety in underlying thinking and values, while others may emphasize more 
generic deep level elements, with a larger degree of ideological indoctrination, in a 
stronger culture. The first has the advantage of greater liberty and scope for idiosyncracy, 
the latter has the advantage of faster response in new configurations of activity, and more 
intrinsic motivation.  
 
Inter-Population Differences 
Between firms in different industries there are greater differences, not only on the 
governance side but also on the competence side of cognitive focus. There are, for 
example, deep differences in professional skill. As McKelvey (1982, p. 202) phrased it ‘.. 
Would you fly on an airplane that had recently been staffed with non-airline employees? 
Would you enter a coal mine operated by hotel employees? Would you eat in a restaurant 
staffed by truckers?’ However, even between industries isolation is far from complete, 
and replication across industries does take place. McKelvey (1982, p. 206) suggested that 
to the extent that organizations are simpler, characteristics are more easily exchanged, 
also between industries.  
For an illustration, consider the emergence of self-service. It emerged in retailing, 
largely outside large firms, initiated by independents but swiftly adopted by large chain 
store firms after it proved a success. Self-service retailing constitutes a distinct ‘species’ 
from service retailing, with a different structural logic, in that a fundamental reversal of 
roles occurred between shop attendant and customer. In service, the attendant moves 
about to collect items for a shopper’s basket, while the customer remains stationary at a 
counter, and in self-service these roles are switched, with the customer picking out its 
own goods, and a stationary attendant at a check-out, in a correspondingly different lay-
out of the shop. This eliminated a limit to shop size. In a large shop, with many products, 
in the service mode the attendant would have to move about too far, with an unacceptable 
increase of waiting time for the customer. The emergence of self-service, with its 
consequent opportunity for larger shop size, was favored by a shift of the selection 
environment towards knowledgeable customers who no longer needed advice from shop 
attendants, an increased demand for less frequent, ‘one-stop’ bulk shopping, due to 
greater scarcity of time, enabled by transport capacity from car ownership and by 
refrigerated home storage capacity. In its turn, self-service affected selection conditions, 
in co-evolution, in that it enabled economies of scale that pushed out small shops. With 
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its demand for pre-packaged goods, it also had wide repercussions for the selection 
conditions in packaging and food industries. In replication, however, isolation with 
respect to other industries was very limited. The principle of self-service was quickly and 
widely adopted in other industries, such as restaurants and even hotels.  
It is doubtful whether organizational focus could survive a merger or acquisition, and 
this contributes to their frequent failure. In view of greater difference in focus between 
than within industries, mergers and acquisitions are more likely to succeed within 
industries than between industries (Nooteboom 1999), and this is confirmed empirically 
by Bleeke and Ernst (1991). 
 
Absorptive Capacity and Isolation 
The notion of a population requires ‘isolating mechanisms’ between them. Baum and 
Singh (1994, p. 12) listed a number of such isolating mechanisms: technological 
interdependencies (restricting the replication of single, isolated elements from bundles), 
institutional pressures of isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), complexity of 
learning (difficulty of absorption), resistance to learning, imprinting, and ‘network 
closure’ (with in dense networks members looking inward and locking each other into 
established patterns). This section further develops the more cognitive aspects of 
complexity and lock-in.    
As indicated earlier, interactively constructed mental categories constitute our 
absorptive capacity: we assimilate input through our senses into those categories (Piaget) 
and in so doing make sense of them, interpret them, and make inferences on the basis of 
them. Thus it is better to speak of the ‘reproduction’ or even ‘transformation’ rather than 
the ‘sharing’ or ‘copying’ of knowledge. At greater cognitive distance assimilation is 
more difficult, replication is less complete and faithful, and more knowledge and 
interpretation will be ‘added’. In other words, at larger cognitive distance replication is 
more limited and entails more variety generation.   
Knowledge, in the form of mental schema’s or frames corresponding with 
competencies, is often largely tacit and stored in ‘procedural memory’, as ‘know-how’, 
and can only imperfectly be codified into declarative knowledge of facts, logic and causal 
relations, as ‘know-that’ and ‘know-why’ (Cohen and Bacdayan 1996). Knowledge 
‘sharing’, with minimal change of knowledge in communication, requires a certain 
commonality of absorption, or limited cognitive distance, as between practitioners of the 
same jobs (Miner 1991). There, mutual understanding is quick and largely implicit, with 
few words needed, in jargon. Communication will be less faithful and fast but next best 
inside work groups of people doing different jobs (Gersick 1988) or communities of 
practice (Brown and Duguid 1996).  
Recall that mental schema’s and cognitive distance include not only cognition in the 
narrow sense of intellect, but also more emotion-laden moral categories of how to deal 
with relational risks from mutual dependence and rivalry. Different ways of dealing with 
such risks are legal or hierarchical coercion, balance of mutual dependence, reputation, 
and less self-interested motives of ethical conduct, empathy, identification and routinized 
conduct (Nooteboom 1999). However, note also that mutual understanding does not by 
itself entail lack of rivalry. Indeed, rivalry may increase with similarity, if similarity 
entails competition, and between professionals in the same field, or in the same 
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organization, rivalry may be greater than between professionals in different fields or 
organizations.  
While cognitive distance yields some ‘reproductive isolation’, with limited 
replication, maintaining distinctive identities of organizations and industries, that 
isolation is far from perfect, for two reasons. First, on the level of communities of 
practice, outsiders from different communities can enter and become members, after 
some time needed for initiation and socialization, in legitimate peripheral participation 
(Lave and Wenger 1991). Second, even at large cognitive distance one may still be able 
to selectively assimilate single but crucial elements of externalized knowledge, even from 
distinct industries. The case of self-service, emerging in retailing but copied by 
restaurants, discussed earlier, gives an illustration. 
 
Scientific Communities 
Scientific communities also may be seen as populations to the extent that there are 
adequate isolating mechanisms between them. That would entail obstacles to inter-group 
and interdisciplinary research, and such obstacles indeed exist, though perhaps more for 
the behavioural than for the natural sciences. To a greater or lesser extent, sciences are 
prone to the following social dynamics. Novelty often is shielded off by an established 
‘mainstream’, for reasons that will become apparent in the following. Innovators then 
often create a following of their own, develop their prominence in it, push it or are 
dragged along by vested interest in reputation and serve, or are high-jacked, as role-
models, with their achievements as exemplars to be emulated by their following. 
Exemplars settle into paradigms that sometime harden into dogma. Typically, the 
founding fathers figure as editors or prominent members of editorial boards for journals 
that form the platform for the society’s goals and ideas and constitute a niche with its 
dedicated selection environment.  
An example in economics is the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society (ISS), as 
a haven for Schumpetarian and evolutionary economists, with its proprietary ‘Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics’. Another is the European Association for Evolutionary Political 
Economy (EAEPE), as a haven for unorthodox institutionalist economists, with its 
recently instituted ‘Journal of Institutional Economics’.  In management science, a recent 
example is the European Academy of Management (EURAM) with its journal ‘European 
Management Review’, instituted to provide a countervailing power to the US-dominated 
Academy of Management.  
To promote their careers, junior scholars are well advised to focus on one such 
community, establish personal connections with the gatekeeping editors or members of 
editorial boards, at the requisite conferences or PhD schools, carefully cite their work, 
and submit work that is marginally innovative but not too deviant from established 
doctrine. Once they have built up a position of prestige, they may be able to afford larger 
departures from the newly developed mainstream, but the question is whether they still 
have the originality of mind to do so, and whether they may be motivated to deviate from 
the foundations of the prestige that they have so painstakingly built up. 
This social dynamic indeed yields isolating mechanisms between communities, 
raising strong obstacles to interdisciplinary research. Connecting A and B, and saying A 
things to B and B things to A, one finds that for both part of what one is saying falls 
outside absorptive capacity and is at best fiercely criticized for its unorthodoxy or is at its 
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worst, and most likely, simply ignored. If senior scholars do deviate from doctrine, and 
bridge holes between disciplines, and starting young scholars come to them for guidance, 
a moral dilemma arises. Should they lead such young scholars astray, into the no-man’s 
land of interdisciplinary research, and have them pay the price of lack of visibility and 
attention that impedes their career? One should clearly warn them of this risk, dissuade 
them to take it, and coach them only if they decide to accept it anyway and live 
dangerously.  
The strength of selection and isolation between disciplines varies. To the extent that 
hypotheses are more clearly and rigorously falsifiable, as is the case to a larger extent in 
natural science than in behavioural science, selection is more stringent, and cross-
disciplinary research can more easily be vindicated by empirical success. Then, the 
selection mechanism is more rigorous, and in that sense in line with Darwinian 
evolutionary theory, but inter-group isolation is less, in contrast with such theory.    
 
6.3 SOURCES OF VARIATION 
 
In this paragraph I analyze sources of variation, i.e. the generation of new knowledge and 
competencies, or, in other words, dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997). The question 
is how invention takes place, and how blind or directed it is. I propose three sources: 
transformation of meaning in communication, transformation by novel combinations of 
existing knowledge, in learning by interaction, and experience-based learning on a path 
of exploitation that leads up to exploration. While the first of these is largely blind and 
accidental, the second can be deliberate and designed (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Zollo 
and Winter 2002), and the third is directed by selection and can also to some extent be 
designed (Nooteboom 2000).  
 
Variation by Communication and Collaboration 
As indicated earlier, absorption or assimilation is to a greater or lesser extent 
accompanied by expansion and transformation of the knowledge absorbed, and it can 
lead to a break and transformation of the interpretative structures that constitute 
absorptive capacity. In that sense, communication not only yields ‘replication’, but also 
contributes to the generation of variety. In communication, in expression by the ‘sender’ 
tacit knowledge can never be fully codified and externalized so that expressed knowledge 
is always incomplete, and in absorption, or assimilation, knowledge is complemented and 
supplemented from the existing cognitive framework of the ‘recipient’. Furthermore, 
what is ‘left out’ by the sender and what is ‘added’ by the receiver, and how this is done, 
depends on clues from the context. Thus, meaning is always context dependent (though 
not completely context determined).  
This source of variation is indeed, as expected from an evolutionary perspective, 
blind, accidental, and not deliberate, planned or designed. Using the four criteria of 
blindness suggested by Campbell (1974), indicated earlier, it is blind in all but one 
aspect: they do not seem to be independent from each other, but to cohere in a ‘seamless 
web’ of cognition. However, while the process itself is blind, it can be influenced by the 
selection of interactors and the context of interaction.  
March (1991) suggested that the generation of new ideas, in exploration, follows from 
personnel turnover, where people from outside an organization carry fresh ideas into the 
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organization that may disturb the efficiency of exploitation but contribute to exploration. 
That is certainly part of the process of variation, but it is also limited due to the isolating 
mechanisms indicated before, especially between industries, self-selection of entrants to 
fit organizational focus, and socialization into that focus.  
More generally, new knowledge and competence can be generated deliberately and 
by design by seeking novel combinations of existing knowledge, in collaboration 
between different people and organizations. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) recognized this 
as innovation by ‘combination’, and Zollo and Winter called it ‘deliberate learning’, in 
contrast with experiential learning. While Nonaka and Takeuchi as well as Zollo and 
Winter claimed that such learning by combination requires articulation and codification 
of the knowledge involved, I disagree. While codification certainly has its advantages, it 
is neither necessary nor fully possible. Knowledge can never be fully articulated and 
codified, and a greater or lesser degree of tacitness necessarily remains. Novel 
combinations of tacit knowledge can also arise without articulatation, in close 
collaboration in teams. 
As analyzed before, in learning by interaction one runs into both the problem and the 
opportunity from cognitive distance: greater distance makes mutual understanding and 
acceptance (absorptive capacity, ability to collaborate) more difficult, but also generates 
novelty value. If the first decreases, say linearly, with cognitive distance, and the second 
increases with it, and performance of learning by interaction is the mathematical product 
of absorption and novelty value, an inverse U-shaped relationship results, with an optimal 
cognitive distance, large enough to yield novelty value but not so large as to preclude 
understanding and collaboration (Nooteboom 1999). This optimum is not fixed. In 
particular, absorptive capacity depends on the accumulation of knowledge and 
competence from past R&D, production, marketing, organization, and, in particular, 
experience in collaborating with others at sufficient cognitive distance. In other words, 
experience in dealing with others who think differently yields competitive advantage. An 
increase of absorptive capacity yields an increase of optimal cognitive distance. For an 
empirical test, see Nooteboom et al. (2007).  
Inter-organizational collaboration requires cognitive coordination and governance of 
relational risks. For governance there is a toolbox of instruments such as: contracting plus 
requisite monitoring, in so far as feasible in view of uncertainties of environment and 
behaviour, a balance of mutual dependence, posting of hostages, typically in the form of 
competitively sensitive information, reputation mechanisms and trust building, by 
cultural alignment of values, personal empathy and identification and routinization of 
conduct (Nooteboom 1999). 
In conclusion, one type of dynamic capability is the ability to find partners, at optimal 
distance, and to effectively understand and collaborate with them, in the governance of 
‘relational risk’. This dynamic capability in the form of alliance capability can be 
developed by building absorptive capacity and experience in communicating and 
collaborating with partners who think differently.  
Now, in view of all this, how blind is variation by collaboration? Collaboration 
requires communication and as indicated this is always imperfect, and can yield 
unintended and unnoticed variation. That is one reason why collaboration is blind in the 
sense that it is subject to more or less random disturbance and fluctuation of 
interpretation and meaning. It is also blind in the sense that one cannot predict the precise 
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outcome of learning by interaction, since it is not based on experience, unless 
collaboration is embedded in some experiential process, to be discussed later. However, it 
is not blind in that it is informed by selective success: one selects partners in learning 
who have demonstrated to be competent in some respect. It is designed: one may have a 
fair guess of cognitive distance and select partners at optimal distance. Applying 
Campbell’s (1974) criteria of blindness, variations from planned collaboration are not 
independent, are not separate from the environment, and later variations can be 
corrections of former ones. They are not, however, correlated with the solution, in the 
strong sense that the outcome can be predicted.  
 
A Heuristic of Invention 
From Nooteboom (2000) I adopt a ‘heuristic of invention’ or ‘cycle of discovery’, 
according to which exploration of novel ideas may arise along different stages of 
exploitation of existing practices under novel conditions (generalization) that pose new 
challenges, with resulting failures that generate pressure, motivation and fresh insight for 
change. First with minor modifications tapped from a fund of earlier experience 
(differentiation). Subsequently, if failure persists, other practices in the novel 
environment that seem to perform well where one’s own practice seems to fail suggest 
elements that may be imported into one’s practice to improve performance 
(reciprocation), without yet surrendering the basic design, architecture or logic of existing 
practice. This is stage of experimenting with hybrids, of one’s own and foreign practice, 
that enables one to try out and discover the potential of novel elements. When such 
potential materializes, evidence is also accumulated as to where current basic design or 
logic inhibits the realization of full potential, and indications are gathered as to where and 
in what ways design might be altered to better realize potential. This may yield the basis 
for more radical transformation, in novel architectures of old and new elements according 
to old and/or new design principles (transformation). That may yield an invention, which 
next has to be carried into application, in a process of development towards a ‘dominant 
design’, and subsequent consolidation in appropriate forms of organization and 
institutions to further accommodate proven success, as amply described in the innovation 
literature.  
 This heuristic is proposed as a general ‘logic’ that may manifest itself in several 
ways. It may govern how novel mental structures arise, in reciprocation of formerly 
distinct parallel neural groupings in the brain (Edelman 1987). The stage of 
generalization, in an exit into a novel context, appears to correspond with the well-known 
phenomenon of ‘spin-off’ in the innovation literature. The process is recognizable in the 
literature on innovation by internationalization of firms. While formerly 
internationalization was primarily a strategy to maintain growth after saturation of home 
markets, it un-intendedly set in motion the process of discovery, which companies then 
started to identify and understand as such, and subsequently have started to employ as a 
deliberate strategy of innovation. Above all, perhaps, the ‘logic’ explains why innovation 
by collaboration, at appropriate cognitive distance is effective. Having to explain one’s 
knowledge and practice to a partner in collaboration entails a step of generalization, 
where one obtains new insights into the limits of one’s views and practice, yielding a 
need to adjust, first on the basis of reframing it on the basis of previous experience. Next 
when that does not work, partners in collaboration offer each other sources of 
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reciprocation, in an exchange of novel elements to try out, and in exchanging design 
principles in search of solving the constraints and problems that arise from the resulting 
hybrids. It is much easier to have a partner to stimulate and assist the process than having 
to do everything by one’s own inference.  
This may contribute to a deeper understanding of the familiar notion of ‘absorptive 
capacity’: having more experience, one is better able to reframe, in cognition and 
competence, what a partner offers in the process of reciprocation. Earlier, I indicated that 
the other side of the coin of learning by interaction is rhetorical ability, to help a partner 
absorb what one offers to him, notably by the use of apt metaphors. The more experience 
one has, the greater the fund of one’s metaphors is.  
 Here the question is what the implications are for evolutionary theory.  
There is an empirical literature on punctuated equilibria in technological development 
(Tushman and Romanelli 1985, Tushman and Anderson 1986, Romanelli and Tushman 
1994, Gersick 1991). While detecting that phenomenon empirically, this literature has not 
offered an adequate theoretical explanation. As noted in Nooteboom (2000) in evolutionary 
biology Eldredge and Gould (1972) and Gould (1989) offered at least the beginning of an 
explanation of punctuated equilibria, on the basis of ‘allopatric speciation’. There, the 
origin of new species is attributed to a long process outside of, or at the margin of, parent 
niches, where there are opportunities for experimentation with novel forms without their 
being swamped by the dominant species in the parent niche. Punctuation is rare, relative 
to long periods of stability, because it takes a long process of outside trial and error to 
establish a new form that is strong enough to turn around and successfully invade the 
parent niche.  
This point of evolutionary ‘logic’ resembles the principle of generalization in the 
‘cycle of discovery’ set out here, with its exit to a novel context of application. However, 
upon scrutiny the underlying logic is different. In evolutionary theory it is only the 
criteria of selection that change, offering new challenges and opportunities for survival 
and reproduction that cause a phylogenetic drift away from the parent population since 
interbreeding is blocked by some physical obstacle to interaction. Here, by contrast, the 
novel environment is a source of novel insights into limitations of existing practice, a 
build-up of motivation to change, and, most importantly, suggestions for novel elements  
that might be tried out, in hybridization, and novel architectural principles to eliminate 
problems caused by hybrids. Also, while the shift of environment may be imposed 
unexpectedly from the outside, when disaster strikes or an invading competence 
destroying innovation forces one to adapt, it may also be undertaken voluntarily and by 
design, in a deliberate step into a novel context of application, seeking optimal cognitive 
distance. 
A key question now is how blind this source of ‘variation’ is. It is blind in the sense 
that the innovative outcome of the process cannot be predicted. However, it is not blind 
in that novel selection environments can be selected purposely, as likely to generate 
opportunities to continue exploitation while yielding novel challenges and indications of 
elements and directions for exploration. The process is informed by success and failure in 
selection. Applying Campbell’s (1974) criteria of blindness, variations from the process 
are not independent, are not separate from the environment, and later variations can be 
corrections of former ones. They are correlated with the solution, in the sense that 
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experience with failure and indications of solutions inform the process. However, the 
outcome still cannot be predicted. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
When evolution is abstracted from biological evolution, in ‘Universal Darwinism’, with 
only the bare notions of variety generation, selection and replication, without 
specification of how those processes work, it can to some extent be made to fit socio-
economic evolution. The attempt to maintain an evolutionary perspective is useful for 
developing a coherent combination of internal and external causes of change, and of 
agency and structure, avoiding both an overly rational view of managerial design and a 
view of environmental determinism without actors. However, with such a bare, abstracted 
framework, most of the explanatory work still has to be done. A key question is whether 
a further elaboration of the framework in terms of interactors and replicators can 
meaningfully be sustained, and here my doubts are more severe. To the extent that this is 
a requirement for universal Darwinism, I share the doubts and criticisms of the latter that 
were voiced before by Witt (2005) and Nelson (2006). With this paper I aim to make a 
further contribution, building on the organizational literature, focusing on issues that have 
been most neglected or incompletely developed in previous literature. First I focus on 
organizations, and subsequently I consider science.  
 
Organizations 
I specified four issues, concerning:  
- The nature of the replicators carried by organizations interpreted as interactors, 
the sources of cohesion and stability of organizations as interactors, and the 
causes and extent of their differences within and between industries interpreted as 
populations 
- The extent to which the selection environment of markets and institutions can be 
molded by organizations. 
- The nature of replication, and its relation to variety generation 
- How blind variety generation is, and the extent to which it may be guided by 
design and by learning from selection   
In an attempt to deal with these issues, I offered an analysis on the basis of a 
‘cognitive theory of organization’, which is in turn based on an ‘embodied cognition’ 
branch of cognitive science that yields, among other things, the notion of ‘cognitive 
distance’ between people to the extent that they have developed their cognition along 
different life paths.  
Concerning the first issue I offer the notion of an organization as a ‘focusing device’, 
to limit cognitive distance for the sake of efficient achievement of collective 
organizational goals. It consists of a culturally constituted, socially generated and 
maintained bundle of replicators, if one wants to try that term, in the form of basic 
perceptions, interpretations, meanings and value judgements concerning goals, priorities, 
knowledge, strategy, work, technology, jobs and roles, on the competence side, and 
norms and values of conduct and conflict resolution, on the governance side. These yield 
requisite cohesion and stability of organizations, intra-industry differences mostly on the 
governance side, inter-industry differences on both the competence and the governance 
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side, and limited possibilities for integral and instantaneous revision of replicators 
(organizational cognitive focus) by the interactor (organization), thus implying a certain 
amount of inertia. The analysis also allows us to drop clear and stable boundaries of 
activities as part of the definition of organizations.  
This may be sufficient to maintain the notion of organizations as interactors. 
However, the notion of replicators is more problematic, if the notion entails that the 
replicators: 
1. are carried by interactors, 
2. generate characteristics of interactors relevant for success and replication, 
3. are embodied in interactors, i.e. cannot exist apart from them,   
4. and are not shaped by interactors in ways that reliably reflect exigencies of the 
selection environment 
If for organizational replicators we take organizational capabilities, the first two 
conditions are reasonably satisfied, the third is clearly violated, and the fourth is subject 
to debate. In so far as all conditions are necessary, the notion of replicators does not 
apply, and if that is the case the notion of evolution becomes dubious. In so far as the 
notions of both interactors and replicators are needed for Darwinism it is difficult to 
sustain. This still leaves the possibility that a wider interpretation of evolutionary theory 
can be sustained, as based on generalized notions of selection, transmission and variety 
generation.  
Concerning the second issue, of selection, without detailed analysis I granted that 
while indeed markets and institutions can to a greater or lesser extent be molded by 
organizations, singly or collectively, and in that sense evolutionary selection can be 
inefficient, significant selection pressures generally remain. Hence this aspect of 
evolutionary theory can reasonably be maintained.  
Concerning the third issue, of transmission, I gave an analysis of replication on the 
basis of communication, and of how next to very imperfect replication this also yields 
variety generation. However, while in communication there is much decay, reduction, 
expansion and transformation of knowledge and competencies, some similarity in 
transmission remains. The question is whether such similarity is ‘sufficient’ to count as 
replication. I am afraid that treating communication as replication puts the analysis on the 
wrong foot, and it would be better to fully recognize communication and language as 
categories on their own that merit a sui generis analysis, using theories of language and 
meaning (Nooteboom 2001).  
Concerning the fourth issue, of variety generation, I argued for the intelligent design 
of innovation by collaboration, and of a path of cumulative insight and experience guided 
by selection in a variety of chosen selection environments that is conducive to outcomes 
that are unpredictable but have an enhanced chance of success. The heuristic of 
invention, or cycle of discovery, proposed by Nooteboom (2000), yields a form of 
inference and learning from experience concerning selection conditions that leads to the 
shaping of new selection conditions, which can hardly be called blind and is correlated 
with selection processes. While its specific outcomes are indeed unpredictable, overall 
performance is predictable, and the process is subject to rational design to some extent. 
Here also, to see it as ‘variety generation’ may put the analysis of the wrong foot, and it 
would be better to fully recognize learning processes as meriting a sui generis analysis, 
using theories of cognition and learning (Nooteboom 2001).  
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Overall, the component evolutionary processes of variety generation, selection and 
transmission are far more interrelated than in biology, with units of selection being more 
able to mold selection conditions, interactors being able, to some extent, to change their 
replicators, replication entailing the generation of variety, and ways in which experience 
in selection can direct variety generation.  
 In sum, as I did earlier (Nooteboom 2001), I am again inclined to rate evolutionary 
theory as only partially valid in socio-economics, possibly misleading, and hence 
insufficiently acceptable at least in principle, and adequate only as a stage of 
development towards a more adequate theory of socio-economic development. As 
indicated at the beginning, the merit of evolutionary theory lies in offering a view of both 
agency and structure, and interaction between them. However, there may be other ways 
to achieve that, which more directly reflect how learning and communication take place, 
in interaction between actors and their environment.  
 
Science 
Concerning cultural evolution more generally, and science in particular, the problems of 
evolutionary theory are worse. Concerning the first issue, of replicators and interactors, it 
seems reasonably clear that scientists, and on a higher level of aggregation perhaps also 
scholarly societies, may be seen as interactors. Like organizations in general, scientific 
societies may have a shared cognitive focus determining group identity, which may 
satisfy the condition that interactors must have some coherent, durable identity. However, 
replicators are even more problematic than in the analysis of organizations. Are they 
theories, or underlying ideas, or elements from scientific paradigms? In the latter case 
they would carry all the problems associated with the notion of paradigms. Whatever they 
are, precisely, here also they ‘float around’, disembodied from their carriers. It is not 
entirely clear what the success criterion of selection is. If it is lack of falsification, this 
entails all the problems that the notion of falsifiability entails, as exhibited in an extensive 
literature on the philosophy or methodology of science. Here also, replication in 
communication, in publications, meetings at conferences and seminars and PhD training 
is more a matter of cognitive reduction, amplification and reconstruction than a matter of 
replication. As in the case of organizations and their capabilities, the survival and 
replication of purported replicators is not entirely dependent on success of interactors 
under selection. Here, in some disciplines more than in others, (even) more opportunities 
exist to mold the selection environment than in the case of firms in markets, in 
opportunities to create a selection environment of dedicated scientific associations with 
their proprietary journals.  
 Thus, if evolution is problematic in organizations, it is problematic a forteriori in 
science.  
 
In Sum 
In sum, like Nelson (2006) I have problems with the notions of interactors and 
replicators, particularly with the notion of replicators being tied to interactors and shaping 
them, more than they are shaped by them. More than Nelson (2006) I also have problems 
with the basic notions of variety generation, selection and replication/transmission. While 
I appreciate their value in yielding a view of how agency and structure interact, while 
avoiding both an overly rational view of agents and environmental determinism, I have 
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problems with them. Variety generation is not blind and is informed by experience from 
selection. Selection occurs both internally in the interactor (by mental experimentation) 
and in its interaction environment, and is subject to collective, political processes. 
Replication entails transformation and thereby is a form of variety generation. I am afraid 
that adherence to the terminology of replicators and interactors sidetracks attention from 
where it should go: to the investigation of learning, in the sense of invention and creation, 
and investigation of communication and language. Therefore, I would be more 
comfortable with a different theoretical framing of the processes of invention, selection, 
and communication. However, I am not sure that it is useful to assign this the label of 
‘evolutionary theory’. If we drop the conceptual tools of replicators and interactors, 
doesn’t the notion of evolution become too general and loose to yield much theoretical 
grip?  It still serves to indicate an approach that is characterized by attention to dynamics 
and emergence, rather than rational design and choice, as a result of selection (by markets 
and institutions) upon a variety of competencies/capabilities (of firms) whose successes 
are transferred (by growth, imitation, training, consultancy, training, institutionalization, 
spin-off and other forms of mobility of people). But is that enough? We need to add 
content to how these processes work, and I believe this is to be done in terms of 
cognition, learning and communication, which is what in earlier chapters I set out to do.    
 
Answers 
Below I summarize a number of questions and the answers offered in this paper.  
 
Question 1: how can we avoid both excessive managerial rationalism and external 
determinism 
Answer: Here lies a great advantage of evolutionary theory: idea generation (variety 
creation) plus selection and transmission explain the emergence of new forms. While 
firms can learn and can to a greater or lesser extent affect their survival conditions, they 
cannot without mistake manage them completely, and some force of selection remains. 
While trials are informed, much error remains.  
 
Question 2: why are inter-industry differences larger than intra-industry ones 
Answer: within industries, sharing technologies and markets to a larger extent than 
between industries, cognitive distance between firms is smaller, particularly concerning 
the competence dimension. 
 
Question 3: to what extent are dynamic capabilities informed by demands from selection 
Answer: selection pressures may indicate needs and opportunities to experiment with 
novel combinations, they may trigger an escape to novel selection conditions, and 
stagnation due to lack of growth or lack of selection may stimulate a shift to novel 
selection conditions to acquire new insights into limits and opportunities. Such exit may 
be guided by a search for optimal cognitive distance on the basis of experience in 
markets. Selection may give useful information about obstacles and opportunities in 
networks. In other words, ‘allopatric speciation’ is not necessarily blind.  
 
Question 4:  to what extent is there ‘inheritance’ of acquired characteristics 
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Answer: firms set exemplars to be imitated or avoided on the basis of how they fare in 
selection and on the basis of what they have learned in the selection process. 
 
Question 5:  to what extent can firms mold their selection environment 
Answer: Collectively, participants in successful breakthrough and consolidation of an 
innovation (producers, users, intermediaries, labour, government) develop institutions 
(technical, organizational, behavioural, safety-related, educational, reporting and other) 
standards, market structures (e.g. distribution channels, financial markets), habits (e.g. of 
consumption) that fit the innovation and improve its efficient exploitation. After 
consolidation, such established institutions and powerful incumbents can to a greater or 
lesser extent actively block entry of challengers.  
 
Question 6:  to what extent is transmission a source of variety generation. 
Answer: in perception and communication meanings are not simply transmitted but 
transformed in assimilation, yielding novel combinations of old and new perceptions, 
insights etc. Hence transmission entails variety generation.  
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i
 A recent example reported in the press is the finding that while children do not have an inborn fear of 
snakes, they have an inborn proclivity to notice snakes, more than most other animals, allowing them to 
rapidly develop a fear of them when appropriate.  
 
ii
 In terms of N/K spaces, with N dimensions and with ‘fitness’ a function of a systemic whole of  N 
features each of which on average depends on K other features, the landscape is ‘rugged’, with sharp peaks 
of fitness at different locations in the space (Levinthal 2000).  
 
 
 
